This article deals with the conception of causation in legal discourse.\r\nAuthors firstly examine causation in the scientific, philosophical and\r\ncommon-sense discourse. Does it make sense to use general causal terms\r\nwhen examining causality in law? We can ask whether legal causality isn�´t\r\nonly artificial construct, legal fiction of a causal relationship. Some authors\r\nclaim that legal causation is not essentially a causation in the true common\r\nsense and thus only a pragmatic political decision regarding the application\r\nof distributive and corrective justice, and economic evaluation of benefits in\r\nsociety, others on the contrary point out that causality in law as such is equal\r\nto its common everyday use or even in the scientific sense. What are the\r\ncriteria in the legal sense that lead us to judge that certain event causes harm?\r\nWhich issues relevant to philosophical discourse may be in legal discourse\r\nignored as irrelevant? The authors show the necessary connection between\r\nterms causality in different branches although they conclude that causality is\r\npluralistic concept. The issue of this article is to find out solution for causal\r\nconnection in particular paradigmatic cases and set up some causal formulas\r\nthat could be used in legal practice.
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